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ABSTRACT
Networking companies, especially the ones with the biggest market shares, tend to offer “end-to-end”
solutions for their customers, with large discounts, that it would sound irrational to decline such
offers, helping contractors make larger profits, leaving clients more fragile to future uncertainties,
and robbing the client from the leverage of optionality. This paper discusses the role of optionality in
harnessing convex payoffs in uncertain domains, showing how ICT Networks’ supply chain plays a
big role in determining a better response to future developments, by harnessing the "multi-vendor"
model, and ends with the story of how Wall Street made hundreds of millions using optionality in
ICT Networks.
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1 Introduction
Optionality, is basically the ability to choose the best option out of multiple options. Which, in many cases, runs contrary
to focusing your bets on fewer options by using forecasting and simulation models, to hedge your bets for "bigger
payoffs" with a "minimum cost", forgetting the consequences of missing the actual best opportunity. In uncertain fields,
such as ICT networks, where developments happen almost on a monthly basis, and demands for higher bandwidth and
speeds increase nonlinearly, with standards in each area (wireless, active networks, structured cabling, storage, etc.)
evolving very rapidly to accommodate technological developments to satisfy higher demand for bandwidth and speed,
optionality plays a huge role, often overlooked by clients looking to reduce the initial cost of installation.
2 Convex Payoffs through Optionality.
In this section I will recall the role of optionality from [1].
In uncertain fields, convexity from optionality trumps knowledge (Figure 1).
By distributing your bets (1/N), making N (N here represents the number of available options in the market that you can
easily acquire/use) as big as possible, and reducing the costs per attempt, you can attain with minimal cost and risk, the
best payoff (figure 2).
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Figure 1: The Antifragility Edge. [1]
Figure 2: Small Probability, High Impact Payoffs: The horizontal line can be the payoff over time. [1]
And finally, as can be illustrated in figure 3, the higher the uncertainty, the higher the payoff.
Figure 3: A convex transformation. Left is the symmetric distribution of outcomes for x. Right is asymmetric
distribution of f(x). f(x) benefits from uncertainty: the more uncertainty, the higher the expected mean because negative
events have no significant harm. [1]
3 Optionality in Supply Chain Procurement for ICT Networks
Now, how does optionality affect the supply chain procurement model you adopt for your network?
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First, we apply a simple MILP optimization model, consisting of demand and supply parameters, where demand (D) is
simply the needs of the network and the supply (S) is the capacity of the supply chain network to provide the best and
lowest cost options, x represents the products you require and c the cost of each product, and z is the total cost.
Minimum of z =
∑
i
∑
j cijxij
Where:
1.
∑
j xij ≤ Si where i ∈ S These are the supply constraints - the total number of shipped units from a supply
node i to all demand nodes j must be less than (or equal to) the supply capacity of node i.
2.
∑
i xij ≥ Dj where j ∈ D These are the demand constraints - the number of shipped units to a demand node
j from all supply nodes i must be at least the demand at node j.
3. xij ≥ 0 These are the non-negativity constraints.
As can be inferred from this model simulation, increasing the constraints (reducing the number of suppliers) results in
increasing the minimum optimized cost [2].
Second, item-supplier specific constraints are constraints that apply to one of the products at one of the suppliers
(vendors). For instance, when procuring a specific product for the network, each supplier (vendor) may have capacity
restrictions for a given product. In the formulation, these constraints are easily implemented as a separate matrix. Not
to forget that service attributes vary for individual items for each vendor [3].
Let’s take this point a bit further. Products usually fall under one of the following sections in terms of probability of
disruption and the consequences [4]:
Figure 4: Disruption Probability vs Consequences
Assuming the probability of failure for a critical device is low, and network disruptions obey a power law: f(x) = x−k,
the product will fall under the following segment (figure 5).
Figure 5: Low Disruption Probability and High Consequences
The procurement strategy in this case should have the following characteristics [3]:
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1. Standardization
2. Reduced transportation costs
3. Global and active sourcing
And the above takes into consideration the client’s network only. But what about the disruptions that will affect a
single supplier? These can include natural disasters, government and politics (trade barriers, political instability, trade
embargo), and macroeconomic disruptions that causes economic contractions. Hence, if you rely on a single vendor,
the disruption will put you at a huge risk as well.
4 A Case from Wall Street.
Can optionality in networks design, help you make/lose millions?
Yes, and this can be illustrated by the rise of High Frequency Trading in the early 2000s. Where Wall Street companies
started competing for milliseconds in network speed, replacing their network devices with faster devices, irrelevant of
which company manufactured it. For if you were a few millisecond faster than your competitor, you can beat him to
millions of dollars in profits on a single deal [5]. This is probably at the far end of the spectrum of uncertainty in the
applications of ICT networks, but it can illustrate how implementing a multi-vendor network can have a better payoff
than a single-vendor network.
5 Conclusions and Recommendations
From what has been argued above, you can notice that relying on a single vendor puts your network in a fragile position
in terms of costs and future risks to the network. Hence, it is recommended to have your network compatible with as
many vendors as possible, and to achieve that, you should:
1. Rely on international and industry standards and protocols (IEEE, IETF, etc.) for your network operations.
2. Implement redundancy in network components with 2 (at least) vendors. Such as having one spine switch
using a specific vendor and the other spine using a different vendor.
3. Segment the network to as many segments as possible. Where the need arises for a proprietary technology, it
is only confined to that segment of the network.
ICT networks face a lot of uncertainty, and because our knowledge is always limited, making early predictions of
network performance and needs is not possible. That’s why, using optionality is a key aspect of decision making in the
early design stages of ICT networks.
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